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     This paper analyzes economic policies in resource rich countries and various mechanisms of 
resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources. Arguments are provided in 
favor of "conditional resource curse" hypothesis:  resource abundance hampers growth if 
institutions of a country are weak.  We study the impact of the resource abundance on budget 
deficit and inflation, foreign exchange reserves and real exchange rate, as well as policies of 
maintaining low domestic fuel and energy prices. We show that lower domestic fuel prices, that 
are typical for resource rich countries, have a positive effect on investment in R&D and fixed 
capital stock, and on  long term growth, even though they are associated with losses resulting 
from higher energy intensity. However, in resource rich countries real exchange rate is generally 
higher than in other countries. Besides, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions, 
especially if these institutions were not strong in the beginning of the period. While there is no 
solid evidence that, on average, resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, 
there is evidence that they use resources less efficiently, if their institutions are weak.  
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lower domestic fuel prices, real exchange rate. 
 
 
         Виктор Полтерович, Владимир Попов, Александр Тонис. Механизмы 
ресурсного проклятия, экономическая политика и рост. / Препринт # WP/2008/000 - 
М.: Российская Экономическая Школа, 2008. – 34 с. (Англ.) 
 
         В статье изучаются особенности экономической политики стран, богатых ресурсами, 
описаны основные механизмы, порождающие неэффективное использование 
сосредоточенных ресурсов. Приводятся аргументы в пользу гипотезы «условного 
проклятия»: ресурсное изобилие замедляет рост, если в стране слабые институты. 
Рассматривается влияние ресурсного богатства на макроэкономические индикаторы – 
дефицит бюджета, темп инфляции, накопление золотовалютных резервов, реальный 
валютный курс. Исследуется политика занижения внутренних цен на топливо. Показано, 
что, хотя такая политика увеличивает энергоемкость, она может способствовать 
ускорению роста. В странах, богатых ресурсами, реальный валютный курс при прочих 
равных условиях выше, чем у других стран. Кроме того, при плохих институтах ресурсное 
изобилие ведет к еще большему их ухудшению. Хотя нет оснований считать, что богатые 
ресурсами страны «в среднем» растут медленнее других, имеются свидетельства того, 
что  при слабых институтах увеличение объема сосредоточенных ресурсов в стране 
сопровождается снижением эффективности их использования.  
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 “So here’s my prediction: You tell me the price of oil, and I’ll tell you what kind of 
Russia you’ll have. If the price stays at $60 a barrel, it’s going to be more like Venezuela, 
because its leaders will have plenty of money to indulge their worst instincts, with too 
few checks and balances. If the price falls to $30, it will be more like Norway. If the price 
falls to $15 a barrel, it could become more like America — with just enough money to 
provide a social safety net for its older generation, but with too little money to avoid 
developing the leaders and institutions to nurture the brainpower of its younger 
generation.” (THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN: Will Russia Bet on Its People or It’s Oil Wells? 
- New York Times, February 16, 2007) 
 
“How do we know that the God loves the Arabs? If he didn’t, why he would give them all 
the oil?” (American folklore)  
    
1. Introduction 
It seems obvious that a country endowed with larger quantities of natural resources has an 
advantage and (other conditions being similar) has to grow faster than resource poor countries. 
This is not exactly the case, however. Between 1960 and 1990 the per capita incomes of resource 
poor countries grew two to three times faster than the per capita income of resource abundant 
countries, and the gap in the growth rates appears to widen with time (Sachs and Warner (1999), 
Auty (2001)). This surprising phenomenon became a subject of intensive research, both 
empirical and theoretical. Hundreds of papers were published in recent years supporting the 
"resource curse" thesis and offering different explanations of mechanisms and effects that may 
inhibit growth in resource rich economies. Several recent papers, however (Alexeev, Conrad, 
2005; Stijns, 2005; Brunnschweiler, 2006), question the mere existence of the "resource curse" 
and make it necessary to reconsider the hypotheses about the impact of resource abundance on 
economic growth.  
     Even without rigorous calculations, it is obvious that not all resource rich countries failed. 
“Thirty years ago, Indonesia and Nigeria – both dependent on oil – had comparable per capita 
incomes. Today, Indonesia’s per capita income is four times that of Nigeria. A similar patter 
holds true in Sierra Leone and Botswana. Both are rich in diamonds. Yet Botswana averaged 
8.7% annual economic growth over the past thirty years, while Sierra Leone plunged into civil 
strife.” (Stiglitz (2004)). Norway, where large oil deposits were detected in the seventies, was 
able to avoid Dutch Disease consequences (Gylfason (2001)). Moreover, Norway increased its 
PPP GDP per capita very significantly, leaving behind its neighbors, and almost catching up with 
USA. 
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    This paper is a summary of a more extensive research1 that compares various theories of 
"resource curse" with a special focus on models allowing for the varying – positive or negative – 
impact of resources on development depending on the quality of institutions and economic 
policies.  Several mechanisms leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources are being 
examined; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanism is associated with market 
imperfections and can be "corrected" with appropriate government policies. 
     There is no solid evidence that resource abundance, unlike physical and human capital, have a 
significant impact, either positive or negative, on economic growth. The inclusion of different 
measures of resource wealth, production and exports into the growth regressions does not 
produce any stable results, especially after controlling for the population density, initial level of 
income, population growth rates and the initial quality of institutions2.  
Our empirical investigation presented below shows that resource abundant countries have on 
average: 
–  lower budget deficits and inflation, higher foreign exchange reserves and higher 
inflows of FDI;  
– lower domestic fuel prices  => positive effect on long term growth even though 
they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy intensity;  
– higher investment/GDP ratio;  
– lower income inequality. 
However, resource abundance  
– leads to higher RER (Dutch disease), distortions of  domestic  prices, and high 
energy intensity; 
                                                 
1 Полтерович, В., В. Попов, А. Тонис (2007а).   This paper, written in Russian, describes results of our projects in 
greater detail.  The main results of our project were published also in:  Полтерович, Попов, Тонис (2007b).    
2 Only the indicator of sub-soil assets affects growth significantly and positively in growth regressions after 
controlling for: 
– Y75 – PPP GDP per capita in 1975, % of the US level, 
–  PopDens – density of the population (persons per 1 square km), 
– n – average annual population growth rates in 1975-99, %,  
– ICres – residual index of investment climate (residual from the regression of investment climate 
on Y75). 
y = - 0.03 Y75***  + 0. 016*PopDens  + - 1.01***n + 0. 10***ICres  + 0.012**SSA + 4.02,  
 
N= 63,   R-squared = 0.4892 
 
Neither of other indicators of the resource wealth (EXfuel, Imfuel, Prodf, ResOG) is significant in growth 
regressions (see the list of notations below).  
    If we control only for initial income, population density, population size, and population growth rates, but not for 
the quality of institutions, then generally resource wealth, fuel exports, and resource rent has a negative impact on 
growth, whereas the impact of the production of fuel is insignificant.  
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– weakens institutions, if they were poor to begin with, does not contribute to the 
accumulation of human capital; 
- hampers economic growth under low institutional quality, but  accelerates growth       
of economies with high quality of institutions.  
    Thus, there seem to be two main mechanisms of the conditional resource curse: institutional 
worsening and Dutch disease. Appropriate industrial policy (or the lack of it) may be the third 
mechanism that has a major impact on growth in resource rich countries.  
   For a country that tries to avoid the overvaluation of the currency as a result of a   resource 
boom, there seem to be two extreme policy responses. In the first case, a country keeps the real 
exchange rate of its currency low enough by accumulating assets abroad (foreign exchange 
reserves) and getting low but reliable interest income. This used to be the policy of Norway and 
a number of other countries.  To an extent, this seems to be the current policy of the Russia, 
which accumulated large foreign exchange reserves (nearly $500 billion by the beginning of 
2008), although this accumulation was not enough to prevent the real appreciation of the ruble.  
The second type of policy implies the reallocation of the income flows to stimulate development 
of manufacturing and machine-building sectors.   
   The first policy is secure, but it seems to miss a window of opportunity for a developing 
country. The second policy could give a chance to diversify national economy, so it is less 
dependent on the world resource prices. This policy is risky since it requires good administration 
and good coordination of government and business efforts. Besides, a range of mixed policies 
may be considered. One can try to find an optimal mixture of reserve accumulation and 
industrial policy redistribution. A compromise between inflation and overvaluation of domestic 
currency is a part of this problem.  
    In what follows we run cross country regressions that do not deal with endogeneity problem. 
Hence, our results have to be considered as preliminary ones, and our conclusions have to be 
checked using panel data.  
   
2. Review of the literature 
   Several explanations for the “resource curse” have been offered in the literature. The first 
explanation, suggested by R. Prebish (1950) and H. Singer (1950), is known as Prebish - Singer 
hypothesis. They pointed to a tendency for primary goods prices to decline relatively to prices of 
manufactured goods, and suggested that the share of primary goods in GDP will diminish due to 
technical progress. Therefore countries relying on primary goods sector have to grow slower 
than economies relying on manufacturing industries. Prebish and his followers ("structuralists") 
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recommended that developing countries temporary close their economies to fully develop 
manufacturing industries. 
     There are two major objections to Prebish-Singer (PS) hypothesis, however. First, a number 
of recent studies used modern econometrics technique to demonstrate that PS- hypothesis holds 
not for all primary goods and not for all periods (Kelard, Wohar (2002)). Second, few, if any, 
attempts to follow Prebish advice proved to be successful.  
   An earlier export based theory of resource-driven growth was suggested by Innis (1954), 
Baldwin (1956) and Hirshman (1977) (see also Auti, Kiiski (2001)). Innis developed a “staple 
theory of economic development” argueing that countries, in particular Canada, had grown and 
developed into an integrated economy through exports of primary products. Other scholars 
studied economic histories of a number of developed and developing countries and demonstrated 
that primary resource sector influenced positively or negatively their economic growth 
dependently on its linkages with other sectors. These linkages are defined by technologies of the 
resource extraction. In some cases development of resource sector stimulates to the rise of 
industries that supply its inputs (backward linkage) and that process the staple products prior to 
export (forward linkage). Due to these and other linkages an economy gradually diversifies. 
However, the diversification does not take place if the linkages are weak (when, for example, 
inputs are supplied from abroad).  In this case production concentrates in the resource sector that 
has little contact with the rest of the economy. The country falls into a staple trap. 
     Historical studies of many resource abundant countries show that the Staple Trap Theory, 
being useful, has a limited explanatory power since it does not take into account the role of 
macroeconomic and political economy variables (Findlay, Lundahl (2001), Abidin (2001) 
Gylfason (2001)).  
     The famous “Dutch Disease” story is another possible mechanism of resource curse. Assume 
a resource boom, a sudden windfall gain. This may be associated with temporary increase in the 
price of oil or natural resource discoveries. Resource boom seems to open a window of 
opportunity for a developing country, a possibility to start a catching up process. However, 
market forces do not lead an economy in the right direction. The resource boom causes a 
currency appreciation, an increase in import and a rise in wages and in relative prices of non-
tradables. Capital accumulation decreases. New opportunities divert capital from manufacturing 
and machine-building sectors.  If there are learning by doing effects or positive externalities from 
human capital accumulation in these sectors and not in the resource extraction sector, then 
resource boom may have negative effect on long run economic growth (Corden, Neary (1982),    
Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992), Auty (2001, Ch. 7)). This phenomenon is known as Dutch 
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Disease since it was clearly observed in the Netherlands in the 1960-80s, after the giant 
Groningen gas field was discovered in 1959.   
     Another example of market failure explanation is the “overshooting model”. Rodriguez and 
Sachs (1999) argued that resource abundant economies tend to have higher, not lower levels of 
GDP per capita with respect to resource poor countries. They introduce a factor of production 
which (like oil) expands more slowly that labor and capital into a Ramsey model and show that 
the economy demonstrates overshooting effect. The economy surpasses its steady state level of 
income in finite time and then comes back to its steady state, displaying negative rate of growth. 
Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, authors show that Venezuelan negative 
growth path in 1972-1993 may be explained by their theory.  
     A shortcoming of the Rodriguez- Sachs approach, however, is that it does not explain why the 
steady state is not moving fast enough to catch up with developed economies. One can try to 
construct an endogenous growth model to take into account technical progress as well as 
institutions and to continue this line of research.  
     The Dutch Disease theory explains macroeconomic consequences of a resource boom, 
whereas the Rodriguez- Sachs approach implies that the economy is not able to adjust in an 
optimal way to the shock of discovery of resource deposits. Market failure is actually at the heart 
of both explanations. A question arises, however, if a government is able to correct it.   
     Another strand of the modern literature emphasizes government failure story – political 
economy aspects of a resource boom. Revenues from resources increase so drastically that 
investments into rent seeking to capture the resource control turn out to be much more profitable 
than investments into production. Lobbing, dishonest competition, corruption flourish hampering 
economic growth (Auty (1997), Sachs and Warner (1999a, b), Bulte at al. (2003)). This is why 
so many attempts to use resource sector profit for industrial policy projects were unsuccessful. 
Governments taxed primary resource producers and invested the money into new industries. 
However, the projects failed due to bad investment climate. Instead human capital deteriorated 
and inequality increased hampering economic growth (Leamer at al (1998)). Low quality of 
institutions is analyzed in Leamer et al (1998), Sala-i-Martin, Subramanian (2003) Gylfason 
(2004), Stijns (2005), whereas Gylfason (2001), Suslova, Volchkova (2006) provide 
explanations and evidence of deterioration of human capital in resource rich countries. Our own 
hypothesis examined later in this paper is that resource orientation stimulates corruption in 
countries with poor initial quality of institutions, but not in countries with strong institutions. 
Non-linearity in this relationship is also found by Mehlum, Moene, Torvik (2005), Robinson, 
Torvik, Verdier (2006), Chystyakov (2006). The latter paper provides a modification of (Leite, 
Weidmann, 1999).  
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     We consider three channels of “resource curse”: 
• Macroeconomic: poor management of resource rent (budget deficits, inflation).  
• Institutional:  
– Struggle for resource rent  
– Instability of democracy  
• «Technological” – inability to reap externalities from the development of non-resource 
industries due to poor industrial policies 
Obviously, there is a fundamental contradiction here: market failure requires government 
intervention, but low institutional quality results in government failure.  
 
3. Data 
We use the general economic statistics from the  World Development Indicators (WDI) – this 
gives us data on growth rates, inflation, budget deficits, reserve accumulation, price levels, 
energy intensity, R&D expenditure, tariffs, income inequalities, etc. for  about 100 countries for 
the period of 25 years (1975 –99). Also, WDI contains data on the share of fuel in exports and 
mineral rent. Most of the data are generally for the period 1975-99 or similar with several 
exceptions. Data on income inequalities are for the latest available year of 1993-2003 period – 
they are taken from World Development Indicators, 2006, table 2.8 
(http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section2.htm).  
For the indicators of the institutional capacity we use average corruption perception index for 
1980-1985, CPI, from  Transparency International and various indices of the World Bank 
(government effectiveness in 2001, GE; rule of law in 2000, RL; control over corruption indices 
– all available from 1996; they vary from -2.5 to +2.5, the higher, the better). We also use the 
investment climate index, available since 1984 from the International Country Risk Guide (it 
varies from 0 to 100, the higher the better investment climate; IC- average investment climate 
index in 1984-90, and IC2000 – same for 2000).  
     Proven reserves and production of hydrocarbons are taken from the BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 20063, whereas data on sub-soil assets4 are from Kunte et al (1998). Overall 
we consider five main indicators of resource abundance: 
• EXfuel - share of fuel in exports in 1960-99, %. 
• Imfuel – average ratio of net import of fuel to total import in 1960-99, %   
                                                 
3 These data are available at the BP site: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_
review_2006/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/spreadsheets/statistical_review_full_report_workbook_2006.xls (see 
also : http://www.bp.com/multipleimagesection.do?categoryId=9011001&contentId=7021619). 
4 Sub-soil assets per capita is the sum of discounted rent (difference between world prices and costs) for the period 
of the use of proven reserves (Kunte et al., 1998). 
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• Prodf- production of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent.  
• ResOG – proven reserves of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent. 
• SSA – sub-soil assets per capita in $ US in 1994 [Kunte et al., 1998]. 
 
  The correlation coefficients between these indicators are shown in table 1. All of them are 
significant at 1% level.  Even though the number of countries for which data on all 5 indicators 
are available is only 26, the coefficients and significance do not change much, when correlation 
is computed between any 2 indicators from the list of 5 for a larger group of countries.  
 
Table 1. Different indicators of resource abundance – correlation coefficients  
  Prodf ResOG Exfuel Imfuel SSA 
Prodf    1.0000     
ResOG    0. 8110       1.0000    
Exfuel    0. 5776    0. 6885       1.0000   
Imfuel  -0. 5630    -0. 6871    -0.9724       1.0000  
SSA   0.8575    0. 9921    0. 6701   -0. 6727       1.0000 
 
   It should be noted that correlation between reserves and production is quite high, whereas the 
correlation between exports (net or total), on the one hand, and production and reserves per 
capita, on the other hand, is noticeably lower. This is explained by different energy per capita 
consumption in countries at different stages of development – rich countries consume several 
times more energy per person than developing countries. For instance, at current average annual 
level of energy consumption of Western countries (about 5 tons of oil equivalent per capita, and 
even 8 tons in US and Canada) some well known fuel exporters, like Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, 
Mexico, Russia, would not be exporters because their fuel production would be just enough to 
cover domestic consumption (Fig. 1).  
   In subsequent regressions we include only countries that produce fuel (69 countries), have 
reserves of fuel (57), and export fuel (181); other countries are not included into regressions.  
   A complete description of notations used in the paper is given in Appendix. 
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Fig. 1. Fuel production per capita, kg of oil equivalent, 2005, top countries
1000 10000 100000 1000000
Qatar 
Kuwait
Brunei
United Arab Emirates 
Norway 
Equatorial Guinea 
Saudi Arabia 
Trinidad and Tobago
Oman 
Libya
Australia 
Bahrain
Turkmenistan
Canada 
Gabon
Kazakhstan 
Venezuela, RB 
Russian Federation 
Algeria 
Denmark 
Angola 
United States 
Congo, Rep.
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Malaysia 
Iraq
Netherlands 
Azerbaijan 
South Africa 
United Kingdom 
Uzbekistan 
Mexico 
      Less than 5 tons per capita 
5 to 10 tons per capita
 
Over 10 tons per capita 
 
 
 
 10
4. Macroeconomic policy in resource rich countries 
     A priori, it is not clear how resource abundance influences macroeconomic indicators. On 
the one hand, high export revenues facilitate the maintenance of low inflation and high 
investment. On the other hand, a temptation arises to borrow and to spend too much, so that 
unfavorable change of world prices or other conditions may result in a crisis. Below we 
investigate which of two tendencies dominates on balance. 
4.1. Inflation and budget surplus  
It turns out that higher per capita fuel production is associated with lower inflation5: 
 
lnInf = – 0. 00673 Y75 – 2.880362** Prodf  + 2.88036***   , 
  R-squared = 0. 015083, N = 41, 
where Inf – average annual inflation in 1975-99, %; lnInf- natural logarithm of Inf. 
 
    The negative impact on inflation persists, even if we control for the level of investment 
climate in the middle of the period. The coefficient of determination in this case becomes much 
higher, but the coefficient characterizing the impact on inflation naturally declines, because 
inflation is negatively correlated with the investment climate: 
 
lnInf = 0. 0163441** Y75 – 0.0568581* Prodf – 0.0576217*** IC + 5.581482***, 
    R-squared = 0.4267, N = 41 
 
Using the share of fuel in exports as an indicator of resource abundance, we were able to reveal 
an institutional threshold: if IC > 49.9, exports of fuel leads to lower inflation, otherwise it 
stimulates inflation. 49.9% - this is roughly the level of the investment climate in 1984-90 in 
Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, Philippines: 
 
lnInf = – 0. 0081041*** Y75 – 0. 0007026*** EXfuel_IC + 0. 0350539*** EXfuel + 
2.805611***. 
  R-squared = 0.1420, N = 86 
   
When IC is included into the last equation as a linear variable, it is significant and negative, but 
the export of fuel variable looses its significance. This seems to be natural, if we assume that 
                                                 
5 We use standard notation of coefficient significance: * - the 10% significance level, ** - the 5% significance level, 
*** - the 1% significance level. 
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resource abundance worsens institutional quality. Last regression works with and without D, the 
average government debt to GDP ratio in 1975-99, and with Prodf instead of EXfuel.  
 
Similar relationship exists between resource abundance and budget surplus. Controlling for the 
investment climate index and the level of government debt, the higher share of fuel in exports is 
associated with higher budget surpluses (lower deficits):  
 
 BS = 0. 0504827**IC + 0. 0360348 ** EXfuel - 0. 0549348* D– 5.146773***, 
  R-squared = 0. 3825, N = 92. 
 
    Exclusion of the IC indicator leads to the decrease of the EXfuel coefficient – an additional 
evidence that Exfuel negatively influences IC.  If, instead of IC, we control for initial GDP per 
capita, Ycap75, this indicator turns out to be insignificant. However, EXfuel keeps its 
significance in this regression as well: 
 
BS = 0.0000425Ycap75 + 0. 0496239**EXfuel  – 0. 0166082*D – 2.123727**, 
  R-squared = 0.3916, N = 88. 
 
      Per capita production of fuel is also positively linked to the budget surplus.  
   BS = - 0. 026311Y75 + 0. 2669832* Prodf - 0.0293449***D–  2.110485**, 
 
  R-squared = 0.2811, N= 35. 
 
So, resource abundance actually helps to balance the budget and to stabilize prices. This 
conclusion, of course, is true only in the “average case”. Countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, 
Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE had very low inflation (some - Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia – 
even experienced deflation in 1984-91), whereas Angola, Bolivia, Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela 
experienced periods of high inflation.  
 
4.2. Domestic investment  
One has to expect that resource rent increases savings that under reasonably good institutions 
could be transformed into higher investment. In linear regressions resource abundance affects the 
share of investment in GDP positively. But the threshold regression works better:  
 
Inv = – 0. 1307258***Y75 + 1.177838***Prodf – 0. 0139361 **Prodf · IC + 0.2737717 *** IC 
+ 11.84***,         
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      R-squared  =  0. 25, N  = 44. 
 
Rewriting this last equation it in the form that makes the threshold on institutions explicit, we 
get: 
Inv = Contr + a IC +b(84,5- IC) Prodf. 
 
This means that in countries with very good investment climate (IC > 84,5, level of Canada, 
Finland, New Zealand, UK), increase in fuel production does not lead to higher share of 
investment in GDP, but in all other countries it actually does, and the effect is stronger in 
countries with bad investment climate. .  
     Similar results were obtained for the other measures of resource abundance – export of fuel, 
resource rent and sub-soil assets. Only the proven reserves turn out to be insignificant for 
explaining the share of investment in GDP.  
 
4.3. Foreign direct investment 
 The relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and resource export and production 
turns out to be positive – FDI is higher in fuel producing and exporting countries. Controlling for 
initial per capita income, Y75, and population density, Popdens, we obtain that FDI, net annual 
average inflow of foreign direct investment as a % of GDP in 1980-99, is positively linked to 
export and production of fuel: 
 
FDI = – 0. 0189986 ***Y75 + 0. 0007759*** Popdens  + 0. 0099592 * EXfuel + 1.404243***, 
  R-squared = 0. 4131, N = 52. 
 
FDI = – 0.0278247*** Y75 - 0.0028366***Popdens + 0.0558353*** Prodf + 2.14422***, 
  R-squared = 0.5517, N = 25. 
 
Perhaps, fuel is so important that foreign companies are willing to invest in its production and 
export even in countries with poor investment climate, corruption, etc.? We cannot say for sure,   
because the relationship between FDI and ResOG, proven reserves of oil and gas per capita, is 
actually negative:   
     
FDI = – 0.0404418*** Y75 – 0.0041042***Popdens – 0.0004962***ResOG + 3.460264***, 
  R-squared = 0.5305, N = 27. 
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 4.4. Income inequalities  
Income inequalities, Ineq, in resource exporting countries turn out to be lower, even after 
controlling for PPP GDP per capita in 1995, Y95, density of the population, PopDens, area and 
population of the country, AREA,  POP, communist past, TRANS (dummy variable), and level 
of authoritarianism, DEM.  
 
Ineq = -0.001*** Y95 + 0.002* PopDens - 1.21(10-08)* POP + 1.25(10-06)***AREA - 10.09*** 
TRANS - 1.57*DEM - 0.06**EXfuel + 54.4***  
 N= 115, R-squared = 0.4406, 
where 
 Ineq – GINI coefficient in the latest available year of the period  1993-2003, 
DEM – average level of authoritarianism (1 to 7) according to Freedom House, in 1970-2002. 
 
     It was shown above that EXfuel  positively influences budget surplus; therefore a government 
has more possibilities to decrease income inequality.  
    The result also holds if one excludes DEM from the regression as well as for a number of 
other modifications of the regression model.  
    Note that our result contradicts the conclusions of another study (Gylfason, T. G., Zoega, 
2002) claiming that resource abundance is the factor that contributes to inequalities. But this 
study used another indicator of resource abundance (the share of natural resources in total wealth 
of the country).  
 
5. Institutions 
   If resource rich countries have a number of advantages – responsible macroeconomic policies 
(low budget deficits and inflation), higher level of domestic and foreign investment, higher life 
expectancy (regressions not shown here) and lower income inequalities, why these advantages 
cannot be transformed into higher growth?  Why not a single major exporter of fuel had become 
a case of “growth miracle”, showing growth rates comparable to that of Japan, Taiwan, and 
South Korea in the 1950s-1980s? As a matter of fact, out of major fuel exporters only Indonesia 
experienced high growth rates in 1967-97 (per capita GDP grew at an annual average rate of 
3,9%, whereas annual population growth rate was about 2%, so that annual average growth of 
GDP was about 6% for three decades. The share of oil and gas in Indonesian exports increased in 
this period from 35% in 1960-68 to nearly 80% in 1974-83, but then fell to 23% in 1994-97 
(22% in 2005) – (Van der Eng, 2002). According to WDI, Indonesian per capita PPP GDP 
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increased from 5.7% of the US level in 1975 to 10.4% in 1997. However, after the currency 
crisis of 1997, Indonesian GDP fell dramatically and only now, ten years later, surpassed the pre-
recession level.   
     The hypothesis that we are trying to test below is that there are two major hurdles for the 
rapid growth of resource rich countries – poor quality of state institutions and inadequate 
industrial policy (maintenance of low domestic fuel prices and high real exchange rate, as the 
Dutch disease theory predicts).  
     Does resource abundance influence the quality of institutions? Some authors (Alexeev, 
Conrad, 2005) claim that there is no link, whereas others (Kartashov, 2006; Chystyakov, 2006) 
find a more subtle non-linear relationship – no impact of resources on institutions for rich 
countries with good institutions (or even a positive impact) and a negative impact for countries 
with bad institutions. Possible mechanisms of such an impact were discussed in the literature 
more than once. First, resource abundance creates stimuli to fight for resource rent – this struggle 
becomes possible under weak institutions and, as a result, weakens them even more. Second, the 
outflow of resources from secondary manufacturing and high tech industries into resource sector 
inhibits the growth of human capital, which in turn poses obstacles for the perfection of 
institutions. Third, high budget revenues from resource sector make governments less willing to 
invest into the creation of strong institutions.   
   The best result we were able to get is the following threshold relationship:  
 
IC2000 = 14.96963***Y75 + 0. 0122836***Popdens + 0.2735595***ICr + 
0.0151996***Prodf· IC - 0. 8323285*** Prodf + 46.58238***  
R-squared  =  0.6159, N = 44, 
where 
IC2000 - investment climate index in 2000, 
IC – average investment climate index in 1984-90 
ICr – “residual” investment climate index, calculated as a residual from linear regression of IC 
on Y75, PPP GDP per capita in 1975.  
 
Rewriting this equation in the form, making the institutional threshold explicit, we get:  
 
IC2000 = Control + a(IC – 54.8) Prodf. 
 
So, if  IС < 54,8 (level of Algeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Kenya,  Qatar, UAE), export of fuel 
has a negative impact on the subsequent quality of institutions.   
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   If we control for per capita GDP, the impact of resource exports and production on other 
indicators of the quality of institutions (GE, RL,CC, CPI) is negative, but no thresholds could be 
found. The impact of deposits (reserves) is insignificant (significant only for СС – control over 
corruption index).  
     It should be noted that some resource rich countries have relatively high indicators of the 
quality of institutions. For instance, in Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, not to speak about 
Norway, the quality of institutions is comparable to that of Italy. The worst institutional 
indicators are observed in Angola, Iraq, and Nigeria.   
     With regards to human capital, it turns out that with weak institutions and high production of 
fuel there are not so many chances to improve educational levels. As the following regression 
equation suggests, higher production of fuel in countries with investment climate index below 70 
(this threshold basically separates developed countries from developing) has a negative impact 
on the level of human capital:  
 
HC = 0.0664327***Y75 + 1.925845***TRANS + 0.0078357***Prodf·IC –0.5880474*** Prodf  
+ 3.234807*** 
R-squared = 0.7276, N = 39, 
where     
HC–  number of years of education per person among people over 25 years old, average for 
1975-99.  
 
6. Industrial policy 
   The most important features of industrial policy in resource abundant countries are the 
maintenance of the low domestic energy and fuel prices (via export taxes and direct restrictions 
on export) and the overvaluation of the exchange rate. The latter – overvalued exchange rate – is 
not usually considered as an instrument of industrial policy, but in fact it is exactly that. As 
shown in (Polterovich, Popov, 2004), the levels and rates of growth of foreign exchange reserves 
(FOREX) vary greatly among countries, even after controlling for the objective factors of 
accumulation of reserves, such as the ratio of trade to GDP, the volatility of trade, the quality of 
institutions, the GDP per capita, level of external debt6. These differences in the speed of reserve 
accumulation – the policy induced rate of accumulation of reserves – turned out to be very 
informative for the explanation of cross-country variations in growth rates: whereas for the 
developed countries the accumulation of reserves in excess of objective needs was detrimental 
                                                 
6 We tried to regress the increase of foreign exchange reserves to GDP ratios on other factors, including capital 
flows, government debt, short term capital flows, but they proved to be insignificant, see (Polterovich, Popov, 
2004).   
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for growth, for developing countries, this accumulation had a strong positive impact on growth 
even after controlling for the usual variables in growth regressions, such as initial income, the 
quality of the institutions, population growth rates, investment/GDP ratios. 
     Real exchange rate (RER) is usually considered as an exogenous variable (in the long term), 
but the fact is that differences among countries in the rates of accumulation of reserves lead to 
dramatic variations in the level real exchange rates, even after controlling for the GDP per capita 
(to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect). The policy of undervaluation of real exchange rate via 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves thus results in disequilibrium (underpriced) exchange 
rate – this effect is quite large and is sometimes called “exchange rate protectionism”7. The 
reason that such a policy spurs growth is at least twofold. First, it allows reaping externalities 
from exports, especially manufacturing and high-tech exports, providing extra protection to the 
domestic producers of all tradable goods, increasing their competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign 
producers, and reorienting them towards export markets. For developed countries export to GDP 
ratios may be already at the optimal level, whereas for the developing countries they are still 
low, so special government efforts are needed to raise them to optimum. Second, rapid 
accumulation of reserves provides a signal to the foreign investors (that the government is 
strong) and also underprices domestic assets, so that there is an additional inflow of foreign 
direct investment that contributes to growth. In Polterovich, Popov (2004) and  Polterovich, 
Popov (2006, а,b) we offer a model that demonstrates how these effects work and provide 
empirical evidence that countries that accumulate excess reserves have lower real exchange 
rates, higher growth of export and trade to GDP ratios, higher investment to GDP ratios and 
eventually grow faster. Rodrik (2007) provides evidence that countries with undervalued 
exchange rates do indeed grow faster.  
     Theoretically, the same effect can be reached via imposition of import duties and export 
subsidies (that was a policy of a number of fast growing countries, especially in East Asia), but 
the advantage of undervaluation of the exchange rate via reserves accumulation is that this latter 
policy is not selective and hence can be effective even with poor institutions and poor quality of 
bureaucracy. As argued in Polterovich, Popov (2006, а,b), there is empirical evidence that the 
effectiveness of import tariffs depends on the quality of institutions, whereas the “exchange rate 
protectionism” works in all poor countries, even with poor institutional capacity.  
                                                 
7The following equation links growth rates, y,  with policy induced accumulation of reserves, Rpol: 
y = CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + Rpol (0.10 – 0.0015Ycap75us)    
R2 = 0.56, N=70, all variables are significant at 10% level or less,  
where Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level.  
It turns out that there is a threshold level of GDP per capita in 1975 – about 67% of the US level: countries below 
this level could stimulate growth via accumulation of FER in excess of objective needs, whereas for richer countries 
the impact of FER accumulation was negative.  
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 Irrespective of the existence of the long term impact of undervaluation of real exchange rate on 
growth, most economists would agree that the exchange rate should be at least not overvalued, 
like it often happens in resource exporting countries (Dutch disease). Below we provide evidence 
that resource abundant countries really have higher real exchange rates and this has a predictable 
negative effect on growth. However, at the same time these countries usually keep relatively low 
domestic prices for fuel and energy that has two effects on growth: negative (due to higher 
energy intensity, resulting in energy waste) and positive (due to the higher competitiveness of 
domestic producers enjoying low energy costs), and the second, stimulating, effect predominates.  
The best policy, thus, is to underprice the exchange rate and to keep domestic fuel prices high, 
but normally resource abundant countries have the opposite combination.  
 
6.1. Accumulation of FOREX and the level of RER  
The data suggest that fuel exporting countries have more FOREX in months of import than the 
other countries: 
 
FOREX_IM = 0.0014471* EXfuel + 0.2827523, 
  R-squared = 0.0279, N = 162, 
where FOREX_IM – average ratio of FOREX to monthly import for 1960-99.  
 
Reserves were also positively and significantly correlated with other indicators of resource 
abundance – production of fuel, proven reserves of oil and gas, and sub-soil assets:  
 
FOREX_IM = 5.58*10-6*** SSA + 0.3174006, 
  R-squared = 0.0388, N = 77, 
where SSA –«sub-soil assets» in 1994, dollars, per capita.  
 
However, the accumulation of reserves in resource abundant countries proceeded more slowly 
than in other economies, even though to avoid the “Dutch disease” they had to accumulate 
reserves faster:  
 
FOREXgr =  -10.25**FOREX_IMP -4.01**logY75 – 0.13**EXfuel   + 20,55*** 
R-squared  =  0.1979, N = 88. 
 
FOREXgr – increase in reserves to GDP ratio in 1975-99, p.p.  
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 One could imagine that resource rich countries employ other methods to avoid the overvaluation 
of the exchange rate (stimulating imports instead of accumulation of FOREX), but the data do 
not support such a proposition. The ratio of domestic to the US prices is higher in countries 
exporting fuel:   
 
RER  = 25,88*** log Y75  + 0,33***TRADEav  +0,33*** EXfuel - 39,07* , 
R-squared  =  0.5255, N = 106, 
 
where 
RER – average ratio of domestic to the US prices for the period of 1980-99, % 
TRADEav – average ratio of the value of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99, %. 
 
    Another regression equation with higher R2 suggests that there is a threshold on investment 
climate index, IC – if IC < 69.7% (i.e. in developing countries mostly) export of fuel leads to the 
appreciation of RER: 
 
RER  = 0,23** Y75  +1,38***IC  + 2,23*** EXfuel –  0,032***IC . EXfuel – 31,99*** , 
R-squared  =  0.6097, N = 92. 
 
This regression demonstrates that countries with bad institutions are not able to avoid Dutch 
disease. Note that similar regressions show that other resource abundance indicators do not 
influence RER. 
 
6.2. Low domestic fuel prices 
 Whereas resource rich countries have generally overvalued exchange rate (”Dutch disease”), 
they also maintain a relatively low level of domestic prices for fuel. This is another important  
instrument of industrial policy that has at least two implications: first, the, like the 
undervaluation of the RER, low domestic prices for fuel provide competitive advantages to 
domestic producers and stimulate exports and production (especially of energy intensive 
products); second, low fuel prices lead to energy waste, hence, higher energy intensity and 
higher costs. Which effect predominates?     
 
   To begin with, it is easy to demonstrate that resource rich countries normally maintain lower 
level of domestic fuel prices: 
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 PFuel = – 5.19 ·10-6** Area – 0.0969954 PopDens – 0.1293359** ResOG + 133.2401*** 
R2 = 0.2261, N = 25, 
where 
PFuel – ratio of domestic fuel price to US fuel prices as a % of similar ratio for all prices in 
1993; 
Area – area of a country, sq. km; 
PopDens – density of population in 1999, persons per 1 sq. km. 
 
It is especially true for resource rich countries with the poor investment climate (IC<64.4): the 
higher the share of fuel in exports the lower are domestic fuel prices: 
 
PFuel = - 0.015*** PopDens - 2.028*** IC - 4.087***EXfuel  + 0.063** ExfueIC + 
261.81*** , 
or 
PFuel = Contr.  + a(IC- 64.4)EXfuel 
        R-squared   =   0.24; N = 55. 
 
It is also obvious that lower energy prices are associated with lower efficiency of energy use:  
Energy efficiency, EnEff, is higher in countries with higher energy prices  
 
EnEff = 1.428463* lоg(Y75) + 3.20 ·10-7*** Area + 0.024037** Pop + 0.0100001* PFuel  
            – 0.0910948** Ind + 4.024574* 
  R-squared = 0.2572, N = 43, 
where 
EnEff – PPP GDP per one kg of used fuel (oil equivalent), dollars, average in 1975-99; 
Ind – share of industry in GDP in 1995, %; 
Pop - population of a country, average for 1980-99, million persons.  
 
It can be also shown that energy efficiency is lower in fuel producing and exporting countries: 
 
EnEff = 1.441066* lоg(Y75) – (1.6·10-7)* Area + 0.024037** Pop – 0.0763032*** Prodf + 
3.59584***, 
  R-squared = 0.1821, N = 44. 
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EnEff = 1.55**lоg(Y75) -0.017*POP – 0.024** EXfuel  - 1.75***TRANS - 300.53*** 
(Y99/Area) + 0.006***PopDens + 0.50, 
  R-squared  =  0.2568;  N  =   78,   
where   
TRANS- dummy for transition economies, 
Y99/Area – ratio of PPP GDP in 1999 per 1 square km of national territory. 
 
If the indicator Y99/Area is omitted, EXfuel keeps its significance though lоg(Y75) looses it. 
 
    However, low domestic fuel prices lead to higher growth. This negative correlation is in fact 
visible at the chart below (fig. 2), and more accurate calculations provide additional evidence – 
controlling for the initial income, the size of the country (population), and the quality of 
institutions, it turns out that growth rates depend negatively on the level of domestic fuel prices, 
i.e. lower prices are associated with higher growth rates:  
 
 
Fig. 2. Relative fuel prices (ratio of domestic to US fuel prices as a % of same ratio for all 
goods) and annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %  
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y = 0.14*** IC – 0.063 *** Y75 + 0.006** Pop  – 0.011*** PFuel – 3.72***, 
R-squared = 0.5217, N = 50, 
where  
y – annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %. 
 
When controlling for energy efficiency, the coefficient of PFuel increases: 
     
 y = 0.13*** IC – 0.06*** Y75 +  0.0048* Pop  – 0.013*** PFuel  +0.318*** EnEff – 4.13***. 
  R-squared = 0. 7183, N = 46. 
 
y = 0. 0686575*** IC – 0. 2.472695   ***log Y75 – 0. 6679008*** n + 0. 0005785*** PopDens 
+  0. 0028251*** Pop + 0. 1499302* EnEff – 0. 8659693, 
R-squared = 0. 5349, N = 76, 
 
   That is to say that low domestic fuel prices affect growth positively (via increased 
competitiveness of domestic producers) and negatively (via energy waste), but the first effect 
predominates.  
  Adding other control variables to the right hand side does not ruin the regression: 
   
y = 0. 1297457 *** IC – 0. 0666434*** Y75 – 0. 0140655*** PFuel +  
     0. 3219971*** EnEff + 1.22e-07** Area  –0. 8560763** TRANS  – 3.889959***, 
  R-squared = 0. 7152, N = 45, 
where TRANS- dummy variable for transition economies.  
 
It is also of interest to note, that R&D spending is higher in countries with low domestic fuel 
prices: 
 
RD = 0.0106823*Y75 –  0. 226082** IC – 0. 0022511** PFuel +0. 4840302** TRANS – 
0.7641969 , 
  R-squared = 0. 73116, N = 37, 
where 
 RD- average ratio of R&D spending to GDP in 1980-99, %. 
 
Or, a similar equation with more control variables: 
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RD = 0. 0098996*Y75 + 0. 0285666* IC – 0. 0019651* PFuel+ 0. 6071381 ** TRANS  
– 0. 0000719*PopDens –4.99e-08   ** Area +0. 004741*** Pop – 1.288969***, 
     R-squared = 0. 7991, N = 37. 
 
The interpretation of this relationship could be that there probably exists the correlation between 
different instruments of industrial policy: countries that try to diversify their export and promote 
growth keep domestic fuel prices low and also support research and development.  Low domestic 
fuel prices allow supporting national producers without resorting to import tariffs – there is a 
significant positive correlation between the level of fuel prices and import tariffs (R = 0.39).  
 
6.3. Low domestic fuel prices and the quality of institutions 
In the following regressions we try to put together both sets of explanatory variables – the ones 
that characterize the quality of institutions and the ones that measure the relative level of 
domestic fuel prices.  We get a number of threshold relationships that generally suggest that fuel 
exports hinders growth in countries with poor quality of institutions, whereas low level of fuel 
prices has a stimulating effect on growth irrespective of the quality of institutions:  
 
y = – 0. 83***n – 0. 0006 *** Y75 + 0. 00031*** PopDens  + 0. 059** IC + 0.0078 *** Pop + 
0.00087*EXfuel·IC   – 0.058* EXfuel  – 0. 011 *** PFuel – 2.60***TRANS + 2.35, 
 R-squared = 0. 6499, N = 47. 
 
Or, rewriting it in the form that makes the threshold explicit: 
 
y = Contr – 0.011***PFuel+ 0.00087*EXfuel (IC – 65.8). 
 
This relationship suggests that with poor institutions (IC < 65.8, close to the threshold were 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malaysia, Thailand), export of fuel (EXfuel) is associated with lower growth, 
whereas the lower the level of relative domestic fuel prices, the higher is growth.  
    To test the robustness of the last equation, we experimented with different control and 
explanatory variables, such as Inv, the ratio of investment to GDP, human capital; HC, 
production of fuel per capita; Prodf, instead of export of fuel, EXfuel; corruption perception 
index, CPI, instead of index of investment climate, IC; ratio of fuel prices to clothing and 
footwear prices as compared to the same ratio in the US, PF/PCl, instead of PFuel – ratio of 
national fuel prices to the US fuel price. The resulting equations are reported below – it appears 
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that the relationship is quite robust and explains sometimes up to 90% of all cross-country 
variations in growth rates:  
 
y= 0.152***Inv – 0.604**n – 0.026***Y75 + 0.006***Pop + 0.0014***EXfuel*IC  –
0.1030835***EXfuel – 0. 0146979***PFuel – 3.924994*** TRANS  +  2. 114804 
  R-squared = 0. 7396, N = 48. 
 
With a different indicator of institutional quality: 
 
y = – 1.451*** n – 0. 0480181***Y75 + 0.0066** Pop + 0. 00043*** PopDens +  
0.006** EXfuel· CPI  – 0. 0399* EXfuel  – 0. 0137** PFuel – 3. 796*** TRANS + 7.678***, 
  R-squared = 0. 7080, N = 30, 
 
where  
EXfuel·CPI  –  interaction term  (multiple of the share of fuel in total export and corruption 
perception index). Here the threshold level of CPI (CPI > 6.6) was close to the actual level in 
countries like Chile, Malaysia, Spain.    
 
With production of fuel instead of export:  
 
y = – 0.0638591*** Y75 + 0.0769304** IC + 0.0049113* POP – 1.05178* n – 2.781959*** 
TRANS – 0.0069054 PFuel + 0.0043451** Prodf ·IC – 0.3640217** Prodf + 1.887194. 
           R-squared = 0.7429, N = 27. 
 
y = – 0.0779992*** Y75 + 0.5354141*** HC – 0.0009169* PopDens + 0.0025545* POP – 
1.058412*** n  – 4.799443*** TRANS – 0.0108899*** Pfuel + 0.010235*** Prodf ·IC – 
0.9241075*** Prodf + 5.460552***. 
           R-squared = 0.9218, N = 24. 
 
The R-squared in this latter regression is astonishingly high – 92%, but the number of 
observations is only 24, so the regression may not be considered reliable. However, it is quite 
robust: exclusion of some variables, like POP, PopDens, TRANS, Pfuel, does not destroy the 
relationship:  
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y = – 0.0635*** Y75 + 0.3260514* HC – 1.140682** n + 0.0094633*** Prodf ·IC   – 
0.7770783*** Prodf + 4.465173*** 
           R-squared = 0.4977, N = 38. 
 
With a different indicator of the relative fuel prices: 
  
y = 0. 944***n – 0. 0275***Y75 + 0.00799***Pop + 0. 00049***Popdens +                                  
0.00125***EXfuel·IC  – 0.0798***EXfuel  – 0.0092**PF/PCl – 2.769***TRANS + 5.095***, 
  R-squared = 0. 5880, N = 47, 
 
Same, but with investment/GDP ratio and without population density: 
 
y = 0.137***Inv – 0.568n – 0.0234***Y75 + 0.00699***Pop + 0.0013**EXfuel·IC   – 
0.09296*** EXfuel  – 0. 010621*** PF/PCl  – 3.393*** TRANS + 1.717 
  R-squared = 0. 6540, N = 48. 
 
   Adding the index of residual investment climate, ICr (calculated as a residual from linear 
regression of IC on Y75, PPP GDP per capita in 1975) as a linear term, we get pretty much the 
same results – only the significance of the interaction term falls to 13%.  
Using the alternative indicators of the resource abundance (production instead of export of 
fuel) and relative fuel prices (PF/PCl instead of Pfuel), we get the following threshold 
regressions:  
 
y = – 0.0290086*** Y75 + 0.0947086*** ICr  – 0.6805491 n – 2.297492*** TRANS  
      – 0.01295*** PF/PCl + 0.0039714** Prodf ·IC  – 0.3602921** Prodf + 5.463706*** 
           R-squared = 0.7869, N = 27. 
 
y = – 0.0163475** Y75 + 0.1199287*** RISK87res  – 1.207602*** TRANS – 0.0167533*** 
PF/PCl + 0.0039267*** Prodf ·IC   – 0.3752063*** Prodf + 4.23377*** 
           R-squared = 0.7532, N = 27. 
 
y = – 0.0580233*** Y75 + 0.4207379*** HC + 0.0503021* RISK87res  – 0.4864664* n  
      – 3.32293*** TRANS – 0.01316*** PF/PCl + 0.00767*** Prodf ·IC – 0.7065034*** Prodf  
      + 4.295662*** 
           R-squared = 0.9277, N = 24. 
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    We were not able to find a good regression equation if RER is added to the right hand side as 
another explanatory variable together with the ones already mentioned – the RER in this case 
turns out to be insignificant, even though the sign of the coefficient is “correct” (negative). The 
explanation could be that the RER even after controlling for the GDP per capita is positively 
correlated with the quality of the institutions, so it is difficult to distinguish between the impact 
on growth of these two factors – the quality of institutions and the level of RER. As the chart 
below suggests (fig. 3), the RER is higher in countries with the better “residual” quality of 
institutions (after controlling for the level of income), ICres.  
 
Fig. 3. Residual index of investment climate in 1984-90 (after controlling for GDP per 
capita) and real exchange rate of national currencies to the US dollar in 1980-99 (ratio of 
domestic to the US prices), % 
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6. 4. Low RER versus low domestic fuel prices  
Undervaluation of RER has the same stimulating effect on growth as the low level of domestic 
fuel prices, so in a sense these two policies are substitutes:  
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y = -3.58***TRANS + 0.135***Inv – 0.00045***Y75 + 0. 0053**Pop  + 0.11***IC – 0.578*n 
- 0.0136***PFuel –0.0178***RER –  4.006 
R-squared = 0. 6819, N = 50,  
 
    It is also important that these two policies are both largely non-selective – they give 
advantages to most producers. However, both policies are costly. Low domestic fuel prices result 
in energy waste and stimulate exports of energy intensive products, not high-tech products that 
usually have very low energy intensity. Undervaluation of RER is usually connected with 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation that means the waste of resources as well. 
   If one excludes investment from the last regression then RER loses its significance since RER 
decrease may require extraction of resources out of the economy (accumulation of FER).    
   It can be shown that the increase in external trade/GDP ratio was the fastest in countries that 
underpriced their RER most: 
 
TRADEgr = 0.0063***Y75 + 0.1047*** POP  – 0.4984***RER  + 4.86 
R-squared  =  0.2402, N = 93, 
where 
TRADEgr – increase in the share of foreign trade in PPP GDP in1980-99, p.p.  
 
According to the equation above, even controlling for the size (POP) and level of development 
(Y75) of the country, the strongest growth of external trade to GDP ratio was observed in 
countries with low real exchange rate.  
     In fact, because it was shown above that most resource rich countries suffered from the Dutch 
diseases (overvalued exchange rate), it can be expected that the growth of external trade was less 
pronounced in resource rich countries. The following equations for EXPgr (increase in the share 
of export in GDP in 1960-99, p.p.) and TRADEgr (increase in the share of foreign trade in PPP 
GDP in1980-99, p.p.) confirm that this was indeed the case:  
 
EXPgr = 0.64***EXPav  + 0.14*** POP  – 0.19** EXfuel  -7.44** 
R-squared  =  0.2956, N = 74, 
where  EXPav – average share of export in GDP in 1960-99, %.  
 
TRADEgr = 0.17***Y75 – 0.68***EXfuel – 5.1* 
R-squared  =  0.3551, N = 90. 
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   Meanwhile, recent research suggests that industrial policy aimed at stimulating hi-tech exports 
has important externalities for growth (Hausmann, Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann, Hwang, and 
Rodrik, 2006; 2006). To put it differently, export of resources and energy intensive goods is not 
so beneficial for growth as exports of high tech goods. From this point of view, it is better to 
underprice the exchange rate, not the domestic prices for fuel. However, in practice, as was 
already shown, most resource abundant countries keep high RER and low domestic fuel prices. 
Further research is needed to understand what the best compromise between these two options is. 
 
7. Conclusions  
   We were able to show that resource rich countries suffer from several shortcomings that hinder 
their growth. First, the quality of their institutions is inferior to that in other countries – if a 
country had a poor institutional capacity to begin with, it is very likely to deteriorate in the future 
proportionately to the magnitude of resource export/production. Second, resource rich countries 
suffer from the Dutch disease – overvaluation of the exchange rate that creates obstacles for 
exports, especially exports of high-tech goods, and hinders growth. To promote growth      
resource rich countries generally keep domestic fuel prices at low level – this policy really helps 
to stimulate growth, but at a cost of high energy intensity (that kills part of the growth 
stimulating effect and diverts resources away from high tech industries).  No surprise, resource 
rich countries have relatively lower quality of human capital. Besides, in resource abundant 
economies the volatility of growth rates is higher and the chances to develop a stable democratic 
political regime are lower (Polterovich, Popov, Tonis, 2007). .  
     Nevertheless, it does not appear that resource rich countries grow less rapidly due to their 
resource wealth. This is explained by the fact that they pursue good policies in some areas and 
enjoy the advantages of having resource rent. In particular, resource abundant economies have 
lower budget deficits and inflation, higher investment/GDP ratios, higher inflows of FDI as 
compared to GDP, and more equitable distribution of income.  So, our analysis supports the 
thesis of conditional, but not absolute resource curse – resource abundant countries do not grow 
more slowly than others, but they do lag behind the growth path that could have been possible 
for them due to their resource wealth. 
   Whereas it is difficult to improve the quality of institutions in the short run, it is theoretically 
possible to switch to a more promising industrial policy. Government has to try to attract 
business for joint projects that would borrow new technologies from the West to increase 
productivities of main non-resource sectors. One should keep RER low enough to promote high 
technology export and gradually raise fuel domestic prices to increase efficiency of energy use. 
Under weak institutions, government interference is always risky. Up to now, there were no 
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resource abundant countries with this combination of policies. However, this seems to be the 
only catching up strategy with a reasonable chance for success. 
     The underperformance of resource rich economies is a relatively recent phenomenon. At the 
end of the nineteenth century they grew fast so that their average per capita income was higher 
than that of the average resource poor countries in the early 1960s (Auty, 2001, p.5). Therefore a 
hypothesis arises that current underperformance is a result of globalization. It is noteworthy that 
Norway does not hurry to participate in the European integration processes. It would be very 
important to reveal which particular globalization channels are responsible for successes and 
failures of resource abundant countries. 
   Chang (2002) suggests that globalization may have negative impact on developing countries 
due to the following reason. When the West was industrializing it was protectionist; it did not 
protect intellectual property, the Western states were interventionist and regulated banking 
industry very tightly. Now developing countries are required to decrease the role of the state in 
their economies, to liberalize trade and the movement of capital, to protect intellectual property 
rights and environment, to deregulate banking system, etc. If a developing economy follows 
these strong recommendations, it basically loses instruments of fostering the catch up 
development. The conclusions of another paper (Polterovich, Popov (2002, 2004)) are very much 
in line with this general approach: optimal economic policies for countries with low per capita 
GDP and poor quality of institutions turn out to be different from optimal set of policies for 
developed countries. 
     Russian economy suffers from the shortcomings of a rather typical resource country – it has 
poor institutions, low domestic fuel prices and relatively overvalued RER. The increase in 
domestic fuel and energy prices together with the lowering of RER seems to be desirable, but has 
to be gradual, carefully managed and supplemented by other appropriate industrial policies. 
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APPENDIX: Notations 
 
Macroeconomic variables 
 
y – annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %; 
Y75 – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 in $US; 
Inv – share of investment in GDP, average for 1975-1999, %; 
PopDens – density of population in 1999, persons per 1 sq. km; 
n  – annual average population growth rate in 1975-99, %;   
Area – area of a country, sq. km; 
Pop – population of a country, average for 1980-99, mln. persons;  
Inf  – inflation, geometric average for 1975-99 period, %; 
BD – budget deficit (surplus, if with the “-“ sign), average for 1975-99,  % of GDP; 
FOREX_IM – average ratio of FOREX to monthly import for 1960-99.  
RER – average ratio of domestic to the US prices for the period of 1980-99, % 
EXPgr – increase in the share of export in GDP in 1980-99, p.p.;  
EXPav – average share of export in GDP in 1980-99, %; 
TRADEgr – increase in the share of foreign trade in PPP GDP in1980-99, p.p.;  
TRADEav – average ratio of the value of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99, %; 
RD – average ratio of R&D spending to GDP in 1980-99, %; 
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Ineq – Gini index (of income or consumption distribution) for the latest year of the period 1990-
2005, % (WDI, 2006);  
TRANS – dummy variable, equal to 1 for (post-) communist countries and to 0 otherwise; 
 FDI – annual average net inflow of foreign direct investment in 1980-99, % of GDP;  
EnEff – PPP GDP per one kg of used fuel (oil equivalent), dollars, average in 1975-99; 
PFuel – ratio of domestic fuel price to US fuel prices as a % of similar ratio for all prices in 
1993;  
PF/PCl – ratio of domestic prices of fuel to prices of clothing and footwear in a particular 
country as a % of the similar ratio in the US in 1993; 
Ind – share of industry in GDP in 1995; 
HC – number of years of education per person among people older 25, average for 1975-99.  
 
Indicators of resource abundance 
 
Rent – resource rent from mineral resources in 2001, % of GDP; 
EXfuel - share of fuel in exports in 1960-99), %; 
Imfuel – average ratio of net import of fuel to total import, %;  
Prodf- production of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent;  
ResOG – proven reserves of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent; 
SSA – sub-soil assets per capita in $ US in 1994 [Kunte et al.] 
 
Indicators of the quality of institutions 
 
RL  - rule of law index in 2000 (World Bank 2002; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Zoido-
Lobatón Pablo, 1999); based on opinion of experts and residents, varies from –2,5 to +2,5; the 
higher, the better the rule of law; 
IC2000 - investment climate index in 2000; 
IC – average investment climate index in 1984-90; 
ICr – “residual” investment climate index, calculated as a residual from linear regression of IC 
on Y75, PPP GDP per capita in 1975;  
CPI – average corruption perception index for 1980-85 (Transparency International); changes from 
0 to 10; the lower, the higher corruption, so in fact it is the index of cleanness, not of corruption; 
 CPI02-03 average corruption perception index for 2002-2003 (Transparency International); 
changes from 0 to 10; the lower, the higher corruption, so in fact it is the index of cleanness, not of 
corruption; 
 CC – control over corruption index (WDI, 2001; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Zoido-
Lobatón Pablo, 1999; World Bank Governance Indicators dataset , 2007 - 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/tables.asp ); varies from –2,5 to +2,5; the 
higher, the better the control over corruption; 
GE – index of government effectiveness in 2001  (WDI, 2001; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, 
and Zoido-Lobatón Pablo, 1999); varies from –2,5 to +2,5; the higher, the higher the government 
effectiveness (World Bank Governance Indicators dataset , 2007 - 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/tables.asp ). 
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